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Abstract. This article examines the reaction function of labour market expenditure to the economic 
cycle and especially to the labour market situation in 24 OECD countries, over the period 1985 to 
2010. The level of public debt is also introduced as a potential determinant of labour market policy 
expenditures. Using a fixed effect model with interacting terms, it focuses on two periods of crisis 
(1992-1993 and 2007-2009). The results indicate that the level of reactivity of labour market 
expenditure did in general decrease between the early 1990s and the 2008 downturn. This could result 
from important reforms in this field, over the last 20 years.  
Keywords: Labour market policies, international comparisons, crisis 
Politiques de l’emploi par temps de crise : comparaison des récessions de 1992-1993 et 
2008-2010 
Résumé. Cet article s’intéresse à la fonction de réaction des dépenses pour l’emploi par rapport aux 
variations économiques, et plus précisément au taux de chômage, dans 24 pays de l’OCDE sur la 
période 1985 à 2010. Nous introduisons également le niveau de dette publique en tant que potentiel 
déterminant des dépenses du marché du travail. Nos résultats indiquent que le niveau de réactivité des 
dépenses pour l’emploi à la situation économique s’est affaibli entre le début des années 1990 et 2008. 
Cette réduction de la fonction contra-cyclique laisse présager un impact notable des réformes du 
marché du travail des vingt dernières années, avec toutefois une forte hétérogénéité entre pays. Notre 
comparaison entre la crise du début des années 1990 et la crise de 2008 met en évidence des traits 
distinctifs entre les deux crises. D’une part la politique pour l’emploi est moins expansionniste 
pendant la crise récente et d’autre part, la contrainte budgétaire sur cette même période semble avoir 
été de pair avec un changement dans le policy mix.  
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Introduction  
Labour market policies may exert counter-cyclical effects through different types of programmes and 
mechanisms. Unemployment benefits and some active schemes provide income maintenance effects, 
whereas other programmes help sustain employment levels (direct job creation measures or job 
subsidies) or avoid layoffs (employment maintenance programmes, such as short-time work). In a 
medium or long-run perspective, training schemes might also contribute to workers’ employability and 
to firms’ productivity and competitiveness. 
Such a counter-cyclical function used to be part of the traditional Swedish model, as designed in the 
1960s by G. Rehn and R. Meidner, and which emphasized the complementarities between 
macroeconomic policy, a solidaristic wage policy, and labour market policies. Labour market policies 
should support the adaptation of the workforce to industrial restructuring and sustain employment and 
workers’ income, in the case of increasing unemployment. Temporary public sector jobs were 
considered as important tools to achieve this counter-cyclical role, using an active measure and to 
avoid unemployment as much as possible. Even if this focus on active programmes appears to be quite 
specific to the so-called “Swedish model” (Anxo, Niklasson, 2006), the counter-cyclical function of 
labour market policies exists in almost all OECD countries. In low expenditure or “liberal” countries 
(like the US or the UK) it is mainly based on unemployment benefits (Howell, Azizoglu, 2011), 
whereas in continental Europe and Nordic countries some job maintenance or job creation 
programmes are also quite developed (Rinne, Zimmermann, 2013; Möller, 2010, Schmitt, 2011). 
During the 2008 Great Recession, labour market policies have reacted in OECD countries, either 
mechanically (through unemployment insurance expenditures for instance), or following voluntary 
policies (increases in benefits generosity, new active programmes, etc.). Nevertheless, the relative 
importance of these policy reactions, in comparison to previous recessions, merits examination. 
Indeed, labour market policies have been under reform for the last twenty years and exhibit trends 
towards “activation” (reinforcement of work incentives for unemployed or inactive persons, enrolment 
in training or work experience schemes after the longer duration of unemployment, institutional 
reforms, etc.), all within a general context of social spending retrenchment (Lehndorff, 2012). Besides, 
fiscal constraint has been particularly strong in the recent crisis, especially since 2010 and the “debt 
crisis” may have reduced the room for manoeuvre of labour market policy expenditures. 
In this context, it is particularly interesting to analyze labour market policy expenditures in reaction to 
the crisis and to compare them with the last major recessions experienced by OECD countries (1993). 
Although quite a lot of recent papers have investigated the links between labour market adjustments 
and institutions (Cazes et al., 2009; Schmitt, 2011; Aiginger et al., 2011), very few focus specifically 
on labour market policy reactions, despite the importance of such policy tools in dealing with high 
unemployment levels (the OECD Employment Outlook reports constitute an exception, especially 
OECD, 2012).3 As far as these policies are concerned, a series of questions might be raised: is the 
degree of sensitivity of labour market policy expenditures to the economic cycle stable over time or 
did it fall in the recent recession? What are the components and leverages of labour market policy 
reactions? It may be supposed that following implementation, active programmes were more reactive 
than in the previous period. But is it really the case?  
To deal with these issues, we use comparative data about labour market policy expenditures for 24 
OECD countries, over the period 1985 to 2010. The empirical strategy is based on an adaptation of 
                                                          
3
 Forslund et al. (2011) also analyze LMP effectiveness during recessions, focusing on the Swedish case. 
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Ohlsson’s analysis of the Swedish labour market policy reaction function, which was initially 
conducted for the 1980s (Ohlsson, 1992). 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we present some descriptive statistics and qualitative 
facts about the reaction of labour market policies to recent economic downturns. In Section 2 we detail 
our analytical framework and describe our dataset and the empirical model. Section 3 provides the 
econometric results. 
1. The reaction of labour market policies to recessions: a comparison of 2008-2010 with 
1992-1993  
 
1.1. The heterogeneity of labour market reactions to recessions 
The depths of crises in terms of their impact on unemployment must be related to economic variations. 
Elasticity calculations show that unemployment reactions to economic variations were generally 
greater during the “Great Recession” of 2008-2010, than during the 1992-1993 crisis (Figure 1).4 As 
far as the majority of countries is concerned, elasticities were negative and greater than the unity. This 
means that unemployment adjustments were more than proportional to economic variations: this has 
been the case of unemployment “over-adjustment” (Cochard et al., 2010, COE, 2012). In France, a 
decrease of one percentage point of GDP in that period led to a rise of 1.79 percentage points of 
unemployment during the 2008-2009 recession. The same elasticity was -0.27 during the 1992-1993 
crisis (i.e. a one percentage point decline of GDP during that period led to a rise of 0.27 percentage 
points in unemployment). Adjustments were in general more important during the 2008-2009 crisis 
(compared to the previous one) in countries like the Netherlands, Sweden or in the United Kingdom. 
Belgium, Italy and Denmark stand out because of their atypical situation in 1992-1993. At that time, 
Belgium and Germany did indeed react well to the crisis, as a GDP drop did not stop the trend in 
falling unemployment. Conversely for Italy and Denmark and more spectacularly for the latter, the 
situation appears to have been very different at the end of the 2000s. During the Great Recession, the 
first episode of recession was indeed characterized by an elasticity of -5.25 in Denmark (compared to 
+0.2 at the beginning of the 1990s). These elasticities confirm the hypothesis according to which 
labour market reactions have been much more heterogeneous during the recent crisis compared to past 
ones (Aiginger, Horvath, Mahringer (2012)). The well-known “Okun’s law” has been the object of 
several studies concerning its evolution during the Great Recession (Cazes, Verik, Heuer, 2009). The 
economic literature is interested in the reason why the labour market adjustments to the crisis have 
been different these last years and especially focuses on the role of the institutions (Cazes et al., 2009; 
Schmitt, 2011; Aiginger et al., 2011). However the role played by the labour market policy is rarely 
the key feature of interest (with the exception of OECD, 2012). 
 
 
                                                          
4
 Elasticities are calculated from the quarter when GDP is at its peak to the quarter when it is at its trough. We choose to take 
the first peak from the first quarter in 1991 for the first crisis, and from the third quarter of 2007 for the second one. The 
2008-2009 crisis led, for instance, in Sweden to the first downturn in the economic outlook during the second quarter of 2008 
and the recovery came during the first quarter of 2009. We can thus calculate the elasticity on that period and each country 
will have different GDP variations. This methodology helps us to isolate the time effect and to consider countries’ 
characteristics. Because it is a short economic cycle and because countries were not impacted at the same time, this Figure 
allows us to focus on the depth of adjustments. 
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Figure 1: Elasticities of unemployment in relation to GDP variations. Comparison between the 1992-
1993 and 2008-2009 crises 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OCDE, 2012, authors’ calculations. 
1.2 Labour market policy trends: some quantitative facts 
Labour market policies include a wide range of programmes, unemployment insurance and job search 
assistance, hiring subsidies and direct job creations in the public sector, training, etc. 
In order to make international comparisons, we use the definition adopted by the OECD that relies on 
a classification of nine labour market policy categories. These expenditures are usually divided into 
two main types: i) active labour market expenditure which aims at increasing employment of labour 
market policy beneficiaries, increasing their level of training and qualification and improving the 
functioning of the labour market; and ii) passive labour market expenditure which seeks to maintain 
the revenue of the unemployed or non-active persons. In order to make comparisons on the levels of 
labour market expenditure, these data are expressed as a percentage of GDP. We focus on overall 
trends but also on specific changes in active labour market policies (the corresponding graphic Figures 
are give in appendix). 
Figure 2 shows that labour market expenditure tended to decrease in the 2000s, before increasing 
again since the beginning of the Great Recession. Denmark is the country in which labour market 
expenditure has been the most important in the long run. Liberal countries such as the United States 
and the United Kingdom are at the bottom of the graph, as they spend the less for their labour market 
policies (less than 1% of GDP). Continental European countries form a second group that can be 
identified. In countries like France or Germany, labour market expenditure decreased during the 
decade to 2008, which was a turning point. These countries stand in an intermediate level of labour 
market expenditure, between the low levels of liberal countries and the high ones of Nordic countries 
(Sweden, Netherlands, or Denmark) (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
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Figure 2: Labour market expenditure between 2002 and 2010 (as a percentage of GDP). 
 
Source: OECD, 2012, authors’ calculations. 
The increase of labour market expenditure during the Great Recession has aimed at restraining labour 
market degradation, resulting from the worsening of economic conditions. Recovery plans were 
significant and both active and passive labour market expenditure increased during the first period of 
the crisis. 
Nevertheless Figures 3 and 4 highlight a level of labour market expenditure lower than that of the 
1990s, although the adjustment to the recent crisis episode appears quite important for total 
expenditures. But in the case of active labour market policies, both the levels and the variations were 
lower in 2008-2010 compared to 1992-1993, despite activation policies that were implemented during 
the 1990s and 2000s (Figures A1 and A2 in appendix). The case of Sweden is quite spectacular, with a 
strong reduction in the level of active expenditures between the two periods. 
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Figure 3a: Labour market expenditure between 1992 and 1994 (as a percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: OECD, 2012, authors’ calculations. 
Figure 3b: Labour market expenditure between 2008 and 2010 (as a percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: OECD, 2012, authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 4a: Active labour market expenditure between 1991 and 1993 (as a percentage of GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD, 2012, authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 4b: Active labour market expenditure between 2007 and 2009 (as a percentage of GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD, 2012, authors’ calculations. 
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For cross-country and inter-temporal comparisons, labour market expenditure should be related to the 
number of unemployed. In Figure 5, we draw a comparison of labour market expenditure per person 
unemployed by country. It reveals great disparities between countries and especially in the long run. 
Since 2008, nearly all countries have faced a decline of their labour market expenditure per person 
unemployed (e.g. Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, United Kingdom etc.), while this was not 
the case during the 1992-1993 crisis. A slight increasing trend can be perceived between the two 
crises, but this occurs heterogeneously across countries. 
Denmark lies at the top of the graph, exhibiting the highest spending for its unemployed in the long 
run. There was a large increase during the last two decades until 2008, followed by a big drop. Sweden 
represents a particular case in the 1990s, as a strong deterioration of the Swedish labour market 
occurred between 1990 and 1993. Consequently as the country did not have much room for 
manoeuvre (in terms of public finances), and expenditure per person unemployed fell dramatically. 
Since 1993, labour market expenditure per person unemployed has remained quite stable, with a 
decrease between 2007 and 2010. Liberal countries like the United States and the United Kingdom 
stand at the bottom, with very low levels of expenditure per person.  
Figure 5: Ratio between labour market policies (in thousands of dollars) and the number of 
unemployed.  
 
Source: OCDE, 2012, authors’ calculations. 
According to these indicators, both the overall effort devoted to labour market policies and their 
reactivity to economic crises seem to have decreased between the beginning of the 1990s and the 
Great Recession of 2008. This situation is even clearer for active expenditures: for instance, the 
decrease in expenditures for unemployed is higher for them than for overall expenditures (see 
Figure A1 in the appendix). This quite paradoxical result (after two decades of activation) has also 
been observed by the OECD (2012). Focusing on active expenditures, OECD analysis shows that 
active labour market policies’ reactivity to cyclical unemployment variations was low between 2007 
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and 2010, although their sensitivity to structural unemployment was higher than in the past. The result 
of this limited reaction is the decrease in active expenditures per person unemployed, which might 
even have been accentuated by budgetary constraints after 2010. 
1.3 A qualitative analysis 
Labour market policies have undergone important reforms since the beginning of the 1990s (OECD, 
2007; Bonoli, 2012; EEO, 2009), which may have changed their reactivity to the economic cycle. 
First, unemployment compensation has been reformed in many countries in order to increase 
incentives for the unemployed to take a job: the generosity and total duration of unemployment 
benefits have generally been decreasing (with some spectacular examples, like the Hartz reforms in 
Germany), and sanctions have been strengthened in many countries for unemployed persons whose 
job search is insufficient or who refuse an “acceptable job offer”. Compulsory participation in active 
labour market programmes after a given spell of unemployment has also been developed. At the same 
time, financial incentives to work (even at low wage levels) have been increased to “make work pay” 
through the creation of negative income taxes and through some social benefit reforms (limiting 
inactivity or unemployment traps). These trends towards increased (direct or indirect) pressure on 
unemployed are usually qualified as “activation”.  
Second, institutional reforms have been implemented in many countries. They involve the 
privatization of some services for the unemployed (mainly job search, but also training), in order to 
improve the overall efficiency of the employment service. Privatized service providers have generally 
been put under the direct control of public employment services (through subcontracting procedures). 
Besides, in many countries, the creation of “one stop shops” for the unemployed by merging 
unemployment benefits management and job search assistance has been carried out in order to 
enhance public employment service productivity, and to increase the staff that might be devoted to job 
search assistance. 
Third, the policy mix of labour market measures has generally evolved. Within passive expenditures, 
early retirement schemes have almost disappeared in most OECD countries (the main exception is 
Denmark). Among active expenditures, those devoted to targeted job subsidies and public sector job 
creation programmes have generally declined, following negative or sceptical evaluation results, 
whereas supply oriented measures (job search assistance, training) have been expanding, as have some 
general labour cost reduction programmes (like the French “exonérations de charges sur les bas 
salaires”, i.e. reduced social insurance contributions for low-wage workers).  
In general, most of these reforms are likely to have a restrictive impact on total labour market policy 
expenditure and reduce its overall sensitivity to the economic cycle. Indeed, in the traditional labour 
market policy model, this counter-cyclical function was mainly the result of unemployment insurance 
and targeted job creation programmes. Besides, following activation trends, the total share of active 
expenditures should be increased by these reforms. 
It seems that the 2008 crisis did not change these priorities. In some countries, temporary increases in 
unemployment insurance or the generosity of short-time work schemes were decided for 2008-2010, 
but previous trends towards activation and institutional reforms have been maintained. Besides, the 
debt crisis from 2010 onwards has increased pressure on public finances and resulted in cuts in some 
labour market policy programmes (in Southern European countries, but also in Denmark and in the 
UK: Erhel, Levionnois, 2013, EEO, 2013).  
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We can derive three main hypotheses about labour market policy trends from these quantitative and 
qualitative observations: 
- First, although labour market policies are linked to unemployment, the 2008 recession differs from 
the 1992-1993 one in terms of expenditure levels and reactivity to unemployment; 
- Second, apart from unemployment, some other factors may play a role in explaining labour market 
policy trends across countries and over time: budget constraints clearly spring to mind; 
- Third, within overall expenditures, the “policy mix” might have changed in favour of more active 
policies, following activation policies. 
 
2. The framework of the empirical analysis: the labour market reaction function 
 
2.1 Theoretical framework and related empirical literature: Ohlsson (1992) 
We are interested in the policy leverages that are undertaken during economic downturns in the labour 
market, and more specifically in the links between labour market policy expenditure and economic 
variations, i.e. in the labour market reaction function. The economic literature offers very few studies 
on this issue. The relationship which is the most studied is the opposite one, relating labour market 
policy/expenditure and employment or unemployment in an evaluation perspective (Layard, Nickell, 
Jackman, 1991). However, analyzing policy reaction functions is a standard procedure for monetary 
and fiscal policies (Blanchard, Perotti, 2002, Taylor, 1993).  
An exception for labour market policy analysis is the empirical work carried out by Ohlsson (Ohlsson, 
1992), which focuses on the reaction function of direct job creation measures (targeted at the 
unemployed) to economic variations in Sweden. From the 1930s through to the late 1980s, these 
programmes of direct job creation – specifically developed in the public and non-market sector – 
constituted a central element of Swedish labour market policy, and more broadly of Swedish counter-
cyclical policies.  
Ohlsson’s objective is to find systematics in the funds granted to job creation measures in Sweden and 
whether they are a response to the prevailing economic conditions. His empirical analysis aims at 
determining whether the political commitment to fine-tuning of the economy by job creation measures 
has been carried out in practice.  
Policies are supposed to obey the following rule:   �� =  ��∗ +  � [ �(��∗) −  ��∗  ] +  ��        (1) 
Where �� is actual grants in period t, ��∗ is target grants in period t, �(��∗) is unemployment allocated 
target grants in period t, ��∗ is target unemployment in period t, and �� is a random error. The 
parameter � captures the degree of systematic policy reaction, i.e. the extent to which an activist policy 
rule is in effect. This equation aims at estimating a reaction function with the grants awarded to job 
creation measures, depending on the labour market conditions. 
Ohlsson considers that direct job creation measures fluctuate according to the size of the labour force 
on the one hand, and according to the number of unemployed on the other hand. If the labour force 
impacts on the grants, the target grants in period t can be expressed as: ��∗ =  �∗ . ���−�, where a 
parameter �∗ is associated with the size of the active population in the previous fiscal year. The impact 
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of the labour market conditions on the funds granted before the fiscal year is measured by ��∗ , the 
level of “targeted” unemployment, which itself depends on the “targeted” unemployment rate 
multiplied by the active population of the previous fiscal year ���−�. Thus Equation (1) becomes: 
 �� =  �0 + �1  . ���−� + �2 .��−� + ��       (2) 
Where �1 =  �∗ − �2 ∗ �∗  and captures both the funds needed for objectives other than keeping 
unemployment low and the impact of the target number of unemployed. �2 ∗  ��−� represents the 
impact of unemployment from the previous fiscal year on the funds granted and �0 is the constant. 
Results are also controlled for political change and for the proximity of an election year.  
In his empirical analysis, Ohlsson disentangles two main types of grants for Swedish direct job 
creation measures: the estimated grants, which are the funds granted before the fiscal year and the 
extended grants, which are the additional funds granted during the fiscal year. This distinction is 
crucial as the estimated grants in Sweden must be neutral to the economic situation and must not aim 
mainly at reducing unemployment. In contrast, the extended grants are counter-cyclical. 
The empirical results suggest that the funds granted before the fiscal year in the period 1971-1987 
follow both the increasing labour force trends and unemployment variations. Consequently, there is 
both a passive and an activist policy rule. Concerning the funds granted during the fiscal year, Ohlsson 
finds an activist policy rule: unemployment is the main determinant of these additional grants.  
Our study is directly inspired by Ohlsson’s model, in the sense that we consider labour market 
expenditure as a potential response to economic variations, and therefore we are particularly interested 
in the activist side of the policy rule. However, we do not focus on the political economy of labour 
market expenditure that is likely to be very heterogeneous across OECD countries. 
2.2 Data 
We use labour market expenditure as the dependent variable, expressed as a percentage of GDP for 
each country (see Figure A3 for expenditures detailed by country). We also consider more 
disaggregated categories, namely active and passive expenditure, as well as the nine sub-categories of 
the OECD classification.5 In addition to the labour market situation we want to check if labour market 
policy is dependent on fiscal situations in OECD countries. Indeed, as noticed earlier, the importance 
of the fiscal constraint in the definition of public policies has been increasing over the last 20 years. To 
account for this potential effect, we run estimations in which public debt (as a percentage of GDP) is 
introduced as an explanatory variable. 
In both estimation steps we introduce the output gap and the working age population as control 
variables.
6
 All these data (labour market expenditure, unemployment, debt, output gap, working age 
population) come from OECD database. 
To capture the specific effect of crisis years on labour market policy, we introduce specific time 
dummies, corresponding to the first recession period (the years 1992, 1993 and 1994) and to the 
                                                          
5
 Public employment services and administration; training; job rotation and job sharing; employment incentives; 
supported employment and rehabilitation; direct job creation; start-up incentives; out-of-work maintenance and 
support; early retirement. The corresponding results are not detailed in the article, but are available on request. 
6
 The output gap refers to the difference between actual and potential gross domestic product (GDP) as a 
percentage of potential GDP. (OECD glossary of statistical terms, 2013) 
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second Great Recession (the years 2008, 2009 and 2010). We also study the interactions between 
recession years and unemployment levels, as well as public debt indicators. Hence, we have four 
interacting terms in our estimations: unemployment rate*crisis1, unemployment rate*crisis2, public 
debt*crisis1 and public debt*crisis2. These interacting terms allow us to focus on the impact of the 
two economic variables in the specific years of crisis.  
In addition, we run a last specification introducing an interaction between unemployment and public 
debt, to test for the potential relationship between the cyclical reactivity of labour market policies and 
debt levels.   
Finally we introduce country fixed effects to account for structural country heterogeneity in labour 
market policies and differences in the economic cycle.7 
2.3 Econometric specification and methodology 
This study uses time-series cross-section data for 24 OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, United 
Kingdom and United States) over the period from 1985 to 2010. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics 
for the variables used in the regressions.  
Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N n 
Labour market expenditure 2.043948 1.325861 .11 7.21 580 24 
Active labour market 
expenditure 
.7210517 .4884954 .1 3.04 580 24 
Passive labour market 
expenditure 
1.303603 .9492559 0 5.45 594 24 
Unemployment rate 7.240123 3.890374 .47 21.33333 567 24 
Public debt 45.99185 27.82569 .821 183.53 556 24 
Log-GDP 12.81653 1.392538 9.338929 16.39151 600 24 
Working age population 22021.65 38866.04 256 207647.5 624 24 
 
The aim of this article is to analyze the relationship between labour market policy and the labour 
market situation along with the budget situation. More specifically, we want to test the argument that 
this relationship might be different in times of crisis. We proceed in several steps. 
In Model 1, we estimate the following relationship: ��� = ��� + �1 ∗ ���−1 + ∑ �� ��� + �� + �� +  ���    (3) 
where Yit denotes the dependent variable capturing labour market expenditure, Uit the variable 
capturing unemployment/the labour market situation, �i country fixed effects, �� time fixed effects, ΣkXk,it a set of control variables and εit an error term.  
                                                          
7
 The coefficients for these country fixed effects are not presented in this article but are available upon request. 
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We control for economic and demographic variables. First, to account for the differences in the 
economic cycle across countries and over time we use the output gap as a control variable. Second, in 
order to ensure that the effect of unemployment variations is not mechanical, we control for the size of 
the working-age population.  
Our second step corresponds to the introduction of the fiscal constraint, Dit the variable measuring the 
debt ratio (Model 2): ��� = ��� + �1 ∗ ���−1 + �2 ∗ ���−1 + ∑ �� ��� + �� + �� +  ���    (4) 
In a third step we add the crises dummies (Model 3) to capture specific crisis effects:  ��� = ��� + �1 ∗ ���−1 + �2 ∗ ���−1 + �3 ∗ ������1 + �4 ∗ ������2 + ∑ �� ��� + �� + �� +  ��� (5) 
Fourth, we introduce interacting terms for both unemployment and debt levels in order to isolate the 
joint effects of the unemployment rate or debt on labour market expenditure during crisis episodes 
(Model 4: Aiken, West, 1991). To test the robustness of these results we have also run two different 
specifications, including one single interaction term in order to prevent multicollinearity.
 8
 ��� = ��� + �1 ∗ ���−1 + �3 ∗ ���−1 ∗ ������1 + �4 ∗ ���−1 ∗ ������2 + �5 ∗ ���−1 + �6 ∗ ���−1 ∗������1 + �7 ∗ ���−1 ∗ ������2 + �8 ∗ ������1 + �9 ∗ ������2 + ∑ �� ��� + �� + �� + ���      (6) 
 
Lastly we estimate a model introducing an interaction between debt and the unemployment rate 
(Model 7, without other interacting terms; and Model 8, including all the interactions). The aim of this 
specification is to study whether labour market policies’ reactivity to unemployment is influenced by 
the level of public debt. ��� = ��� + �1 ∗ ���−1 + �2 ∗ ���−1 + �3 ∗ ���−1 ∗ ���−1 + �� + �� +  ���   (7) 
 ��� = ��� + �1 ∗ ���−1 + �2 ∗ ���−1 + �3 ∗ ���−1 ∗ ���−1 + �4 ∗ ���−1 ∗ ������1 + �5 ∗ ���−1 ∗������2 + �6 ∗ ���−1 ∗ ������1 + �7 ∗ ���−1 ∗ ������2 + �� + �� + ���         (8) 
 
To test the robustness of our specification, models introducing year dummies (and no time fixed 
effects) instead of crisis dummies have also been estimated. In the results, we focus on dummies 
corresponding to crisis years (especially 1993 and 2008), and on the interactions between recession 
years (especially 1993 and 2008) and unemployment levels, as well as public debt indicators. Results 
of these estimations are presented in the appendix (Tables A1 to A3). 
2.4 OLS/PCSE estimations 
We run OLS with PCSE (Panel corrected standard errors) estimator from Beck and Katz (1995) 
appropriate for time-series cross-section data (TSCS). Before running regressions, we run unit root 
tests to check whether our variables are stationary or not. Following Maddala and Wu (1999), we run a 
Fisher test which assumes that some series are non-stationary under the null hypothesis. We find that 
our variables in level terms are stationary. Because Time-Series-Cross-Section (TSCS) data have 
                                                          
8
 The specifications arenot presented here, but confirm results of Model 4. These are available upon request. 
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repeated observations on fixed units, both the temporal and spatial properties of TSCS data make the 
use of ordinary least squares (OLS) problematic.  
The OLS regression assumes homoskedasticity and independence of the errors. These specific 
hypotheses are not verified. As a result, we are able to use the ordinary least squares (OLS) with Beck 
and Katz’s (1995) panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). We also test for multicollinearity between 
our variables, but none of them are significantly correlated. Finally, we run a Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel-data models: we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation, 
concluding that the data have first-order autocorrelation. We correct for this using the PCSE 
procedure. 
Results with the PCSE estimator are shown in the following tables. We present the results for both the 
total labour market expenditure, as a dependent variable and for a more detailed level of labour market 
expenditure which distinguishes active and passive labour market expenditure. The three tables present 
the six specifications we detailed above for each type of labour market expenditure. 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1 Total labour market expenditure 
 
Table 2: PCSE estimation for total labour market expenditure – results of the models with crisis 
dummies 
Dependent variable: labour market spending 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (8) 
Unemployment rate 0.0698*** 0.0619*** 0.0553*** 0.0529*** 0.0723*** 0.0673*** 
 
(0.00973) (0.00993) (0.0112) (0.0119) (0.0166) (0.0170) 
Debt 
 
0.00429** 0.00639*** 0.00653*** 0.00886*** 0.00953*** 
 
 
(0.00204) (0.00186) (0.00184) (0.00243) (0.00267) 
Crisis 1 
 
 
0.295*** 0.297*** 0.290*** 0.342*** 
 
 
 
(0.0811) (0.0986) (0.0818) (0.101) 
Crisis 2 
 
 
-0.172** -0.296* -0.170** -0.242 
 
 
 
(0.0789) (0.154) (0.0793) (0.148) 
Unemployment rate * 
crisis 1 
 
  
0.000380 
 
0.00324 
 
 
  
(0.0101) 
 
(0.00844) 
Unemployment rate * 
crisis 2 
 
  
0.0172 
 
0.0182 
 
 
  
(0.0151) 
 
(0.0152) 
Debt * crisis 1 
     
-0.00154 
      
(0.00143) 
Debt * crisis 2 
     
-0.00131* 
      
(0.000728) 
Unemployment rate * 
debt     
-0.000349 -0.000319 
    
(0.000258) (0.000258) 
Output gap -0.0776*** -0.0737*** -0.0726*** -0.0729*** -0.0721*** -0.0726*** 
 
(0.00546) (0.00620) (0.00819) (0.00836) (0.00816) (0.00831) 
Working age 
population 
-0.00767*** -0.00701*** -0.000849 -0.00102 -0.000460 -0.000921 
 
(0.00229) (0.00258) (0.00252) (0.00240) (0.00270) (0.00247) 
Constant 0.782*** 0.793*** 0.771*** 0.796*** 0.646*** 0.671*** 
  (0.120) (0.117) (0.111) (0.114) (0.138) (0.140) 
R-squared 0.660 0.684 0.773 0.779 0.771 0.779 
Observations        512 487 487 487 487 487 
Note: Panel Corrected Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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As expected, the PCSE estimator shows a positive correlation between unemployment and labour 
market expenditure over the period from1985 to 2010. Public debt also appears positively correlated 
with labour market policy expenditure, although the coefficients are very small. This means that over 
the long run, high LMP expenditures are associated with more expansionary budgetary policies. Given 
the negative sign of the output gap coefficients, we check that a positive output gap (indicating 
observed growth above the potential growth level) reduces expenditures, whereas negative values 
induce a rise in the LMP effort. Crisis dummies indicate a contrast between the 1990s crisis and the 
last recession (Model 3): the coefficients associated with the first crisis dummy are positive and 
significant, whereas they are negative (and most of the time significant) for the second one. This 
suggests that the crisis of early 1990s saw a larger impact on labour market expenditure than has been 
the case during the current crisis.  
Besides, results for interactions (Model 4) indicate no significant relationship between unemployment 
and labour market expenditure in both recessions. These results indicate a low reactivity of total labour 
market spending to crises. The fiscal constraint does not seem to have been a main determinant of 
labour market policy expenditures in economic downturns (Model 8). Nevertheless it did become 
significantly negative (with a small coefficient) during the Great Recession, when the interaction 
between unemployment and debt is taken into account.  
Finally, the analysis of country dummies reveals a strong heterogeneity across countries. Some 
countries display positive relationship to labour market policy expenditure over time (Austria, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Norway, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia), whereas 
others show a negative relationship (Canada, Hungary, Sweden and the UK)9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 Results are available on request. 
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3.2 Active and passive labour market expenditure 
 
Table 3: PCSE estimation for active labour market expenditure: results of the models with crisis 
dummies 
Dependent variable: active labour market spending 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (8) 
Unemployment rate 0.0119*** 0.00857*** 0.00605* 0.00622* 0.0145** 0.0132** 
 
(0.00271) (0.00304) (0.00313) (0.00340) (0.00571) (0.00599) 
Debt 
 
0.00164** 0.00185*** 0.00186*** 0.00312*** 0.00266** 
 
 
(0.000669) (0.000643) (0.000643) (0.00104) (0.00106) 
Crisis 1 
 
 
0.0682*** 0.122*** 0.0666*** 0.127*** 
 
 
 
(0.0154) (0.0263) (0.0158) (0.0294) 
Crisis 2 
 
 
-0.00916 -0.0427 -0.00887 -0.0669** 
 
 
 
(0.0165) (0.0293) (0.0168) (0.0304) 
Unemployment rate * 
crisis 1 
 
  
-0.00684*** 
 
-0.00630*** 
 
 
  
(0.00238) 
 
(0.00228) 
Unemployment rate * 
crisis 2 
 
  
0.00508 
 
0.00444 
 
 
  
(0.00332) 
 
(0.00335) 
Debt * crisis 1 
     
-0.000226 
      
(0.000443) 
Debt * crisis 2 
     
0.000635 
      
(0.000388) 
Unemployment rate * 
debt     
-0.000175* -0.000140 
    
(0.000101) (0.000101) 
Output gap -0.0158*** -0.0143*** -0.0135*** -0.0136*** -0.0132*** -0.0133*** 
 
(0.00160) (0.00178) (0.00194) (0.00191) (0.00198) (0.00195) 
Working age 
population 
-0.00326*** -0.00335*** -0.00260*** -0.00281*** -0.00236*** -0.00237*** 
 
(0.000844) (0.000910) (0.000859) (0.000887) (0.000899) (0.000800) 
Constant 0.297*** 0.306*** 0.314*** 0.318*** 0.251*** 0.270*** 
  (0.0363) (0.0369) (0.0330) (0.0348) (0.0478) (0.0503) 
R-squared 0.528 0.548 0.615 0.616 0.616 0.618 
Observations        512 487 487 487 487 487 
Note: Panel Corrected Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Active labour market expenditure is positively correlated with unemployment over the whole period of 
1985 to 2010, in all specifications. However a positive and significant relationship (but with a very 
small coefficient) can also be found between public debt and active labour market expenditure in the 
long run. A positive coefficient is associated with the first crisis and a negative one with the second 
crisis – although it is not always significant.  
When focusing on crisis episodes, the interactions with unemployment are negative for the first crisis, 
but not significant for the second one. As far as public debt is concerned, it seems to be positively 
correlated to ALMP during the late-2000s recession, although not significantly. These results reveal a 
contrast between the two recessions, with active policies potentially having priority in countries where 
public debt has been high over the recent years of recession. Nevertheless, crossed effects between 
unemployment and debt are significant only in one specification (Model 7).  
Country fixed effects are generally positive with small coefficients (but higher for Denmark and 
Slovenia), and the only country with a negative and significant country dummy is the UK. The 
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decomposition of active expenditures by different categories confirms the general picture:
10
 job 
creation programmes, in the public and private sector (job subsidies) are positively correlated with 
unemployment over the whole period, and their reaction to unemployment was positive during the first 
crisis, whereas we find a negative sign for the interacting term during the second crisis. In fact, the 
second crisis is found to exert a positive influence on job search assistance expenditures. 
Table 4: PCSE estimation for passive labour market expenditure – results of the models with crisis 
dummies 
Dependent variable: passive labour market spending 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (8) 
Unemployment rate 0.0562*** 0.0527*** 0.0540*** 0.0511*** 0.0573*** 0.0553*** 
 
(0.0108) (0.0114) (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0171) (0.0169) 
Debt 
 
0.00229 0.00467*** 0.00458*** 0.00515** 0.00654** 
 
 
(0.00192) (0.00159) (0.00159) (0.00236) (0.00266) 
Crisis 1 
 
 
0.241*** 0.184* 0.239*** 0.226** 
 
 
 
(0.0723) (0.0960) (0.0724) (0.0978) 
Crisis 2 
 
 
-0.177** -0.235 -0.176** -0.170 
 
 
 
(0.0817) (0.145) (0.0817) (0.147) 
Unemployment rate * 
crisis 1 
 
  
0.00718 
 
0.00957 
 
 
  
(0.0115) 
 
(0.0103) 
Unemployment rate * 
crisis 2 
 
  
0.00917 
 
0.0130 
 
 
  
(0.0179) 
 
(0.0176) 
Debt * crisis 1 
     
-0.00130 
      
(0.00103) 
Debt * crisis 2 
     
-0.00216*** 
      
(0.000759) 
Unemployment rate * 
debt     
-7.01e-05 -0.000116 
    
(0.000282) (0.000291) 
Output gap -0.0615*** -0.0591*** -0.0586*** -0.0586*** -0.0585*** -0.0588*** 
 
(0.00725) (0.00790) (0.00917) (0.00931) (0.00917) (0.00930) 
Working age 
population 
-0.00443 -0.00385 0.00230 0.00197 0.00235 0.00173 
 
(0.00784) (0.00798) (0.00653) (0.00669) (0.00661) (0.00653) 
Constant 0.496*** 0.496*** 0.415*** 0.441*** 0.392** 0.385** 
  (0.157) (0.154) (0.125) (0.124) (0.153) (0.151) 
R-squared 0.611 0.630 0.752 0.751 0.751 0.755 
Observations        526 501 501 501 501 501 
Note: Panel Corrected Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
As expected, the PCSE estimator shows a positive correlation between unemployment and passive 
labour market expenditure that consists mainly of unemployment benefits (and some early retirement 
programmes, especially in the 1980s). We also find robust evidence that public debt is positively 
correlated with passive labour market expenditure (with a small coefficient again). Nevertheless, 
contrary to the first crisis (positive and significant dummy), the recent downturn (2007 to 2010) is 
either not significantly or negatively related to passive expenditures in comparison to the whole 
period.  
Moreover, the results for interaction terms indicate no significant relationship between unemployment 
and passive labour market expenditure during recessions. For public debt, interaction terms are not 
significant in the 1990s, and negative (and significant) at the end of 2000s. The result is therefore the 
opposite of the one obtained for ALMP, confirming that debt influences the labour market policy mix 
                                                          
10
 Results are available on request. 
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and the choice between active and passive programmes. Country fixed effects are positive for Austria, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Norway, Slovenia and Slovakia, and negative for Canada, 
Hungary, Poland, the UK and Sweden. 
To summarize, a first result is that labour market policy has been correlated with unemployment over 
the whole period of observation, and this relationship comes mainly from passive expenditures 
(according to marginal effects, see Table 5). This relationship is stable whatever the specification of 
the model, and even when interactions between debt and unemployment are taken into account 
(Model 6).  
Table 5: Marginal effects of unemployment (Model 6) 
Marginal effect of unemployment according to the 
dependent variables 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
Total labour 
market 
expenditure 
Active labour 
market 
expenditure 
Passive labour 
market 
expenditure 
Min 0.0945*** 0.0119** 0.0810*** 
 
(0.0138) (0.00552) (0.0155) 
Mean less one 
standard 
deviation 
0.0817*** 0.0104** 0.0715*** 
 
(0.0111) (0.00425) (0.0129) 
Mean 0.0611*** 0.00780** 0.0554*** 
 
(0.00919) (0.00337) (0.0110) 
Mean plus one 
standard 
deviation 
0.0405*** 0.00524 0.0393*** 
 
(0.0112) (0.00461) (0.0132) 
Max -0.0388 -0.00461 -0.0230 
  (0.0321) (0.0146) (0.0365) 
Rank 2 0.738 0.753 
Observations        487 487 501 
Note: Panel Corrected Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Second, both types of expenditures are positively related to public debt levels: budget constraints do 
not seem to displace labour market policies, but would surprisingly (slightly) increase them. This 
effect might be related to the inertia of these expenditures (they are socially difficult to reduce) and to 
the fact that such policies could sustain the goal of increased labour market efficiency in a context of 
rising public deficits. 
During years of recession, policy reactions to unemployment have been limited, with the exception of 
a decrease in ALMP for a given level of unemployment during the first crisis. Public did not exert any 
significant influence in the 1990s, but reduced passive expenditures and increased active spending in 
the 2000s. Budget pressure has not led to cuts in overall labour market expenditure, but seems to 
influence the policy mix between active and passive measures.  
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Conclusion 
Labour market policy expenditure has decreased in the long run as labour market policies have 
undergone major reforms for two decades. These reforms appear to influence the reactivity of labour 
market expenditure to the economic cycle. 
The empirical results point out the positive relationship between unemployment and all types of labour 
market expenditure over the last 30 years. Thus labour market policy appears to react well to the 
economic situation in the long run. The relationship between overall labour market expenditure and 
unemployment is however not specific in times of crises, and we can attest that the importance of the 
economic situation in the response function of labour market expenditure is decreasing with time.  
The response to crises did nevertheless clearly change between the early 1990s crisis and the recent 
“Great Recession”. First, labour market policy was less expansionary during the 2008-2010 downturn. 
Second, while in the long run, the budget constraint is significantly and positively correlated with 
labour market expenditure, it seems rather to influence the policy mix during the most recent crisis 
(decreasing passive labour market policy and increasing active labour market policy). Therefore, both 
the reforms undertaken since the 1990s and the debt crisis matter for labour market policy, while its 
counter-cyclical function has been weakened. In contrast, very high levels of unemployment in the 
European Union might suggest stronger intervention focusing on job creation (Grahl and Teague, 
2013). 
Our results indicate a strong heterogeneity across countries. Some restrictive trends can be found in 
some Anglo-Saxon countries (Canada, UK), but also in Sweden, whereas a number of recent policies 
might indicate a change in priorities in some countries towards a more expansionary LMP (such as the 
increase in job creation programmes in France). But restrictions are getting stronger in Southern 
European and Baltic countries (Estonia has for instance launched an important labour market reform in 
2009 that strengthen labour market flexibility (Eamets, 2013)).  
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Appendix: additional figures 
 
Figure A1: Ratio between active labour market policies (as a percentage of GDP) and the number of 
unemployed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OCDE, 2012, authors’ calculations. 
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Figure A2: Evolution in the unemployment rate in 24 OECD countries, between 1985 and 2010 
 
Source: OCDE, 2012. 
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Figure A3: Labour market expenditures in 24 OECD countries, between 1985 and 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OCDE, 2012 
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Table A1. PCSE estimation for total labour market expenditure 
 
 
Dependent variable: labour market spending 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Unemployment rate 0.0731*** 0.0607*** 0.0616*** 0.0602*** 0.0610*** 0.0382*** 0.0409*** 
 
(0.00880) (0.00926) (0.00925) (0.00928) (0.00927) (0.0116) (0.0113) 
Debt 
 
0.00671*** 0.00683*** 0.00680*** 0.00694*** 0.00129 0.00158 
  
(0.00172) (0.00169) (0.00173) (0.00169) (0.00247) (0.00246) 
1993 0.682*** 0.666*** 0.612*** 0.706*** 0.650*** 0.664*** 0.669*** 
 
(0.0729) (0.0780) (0.0924) (0.0821) (0.0968) (0.106) (0.0848) 
2008 -0.360*** -0.407*** -0.555*** -0.430*** -0.582*** -0.568*** -0.367*** 
 
(0.0906) (0.0983) (0.124) (0.0997) (0.123) (0.142) (0.110) 
Unemployment rate * 
1993   
0.00549 
 
0.00724 0.00738 
 
   
(0.00578) 
 
(0.00555) (0.00518) 
 
Unemployment rate * 
2008   
0.0226* 
 
0.0228* 0.0252* 
 
   
(0.0131) 
 
(0.0131) (0.0151) 
 
Debt * 1993 
   
-0.000905 -0.00119 -0.00150* 
 
    
(0.000883) (0.000917) (0.000891) 
 
Debt * 2008 
   
0.000527* 0.000553* 0.000871** 
 
    
(0.000300) (0.000297) (0.000380) 
 
Unemployment rate * 
debt      
0.000727*** 0.000649*** 
     
(0.000190) (0.000185) 
Output gap -0.0619*** -0.0547*** -0.0562*** -0.0554*** -0.0570*** -0.0488*** -0.0470*** 
 
(0.00705) (0.00676) (0.00697) (0.00677) (0.00696) (0.00695) (0.00673) 
Working age population 0.00785 0.00987* 0.0105** 0.00996* 0.0106** 0.00834 0.00773 
 
(0.00546) (0.00576) (0.00533) (0.00572) (0.00527) (0.00551) (0.00603) 
Constant 0.616*** 0.664*** 0.657*** 0.665*** 0.658*** 0.839*** 0.822*** 
  (0.0917) (0.0965) (0.0931) (0.0963) (0.0929) (0.108) (0.110) 
R-squared 0.721 0.738 0.756 0.739 0.758 0.761 0.740 
Observations        512 487 487 487 487 487 487 
Note: Panel Corrected Standard errors in parentheses ; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table A2. PCSE estimation for active labour market expenditure 
 
Dependent variable: active labour market spending 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Unemployment rate 0.0101*** 0.00775** 0.00791** 0.00791** 0.00810** 0.0130*** 0.0125*** 
 
(0.00273) (0.00337) (0.00337) (0.00339) (0.00339) (0.00428) (0.00422) 
Debt 
 
0.00163*** 0.00157** 0.00161** 0.00155** 0.00277*** 0.00281*** 
  
(0.000628) (0.000630) (0.000630) (0.000631) (0.000910) (0.000909) 
1993 0.211*** 0.225*** 0.243*** 0.210*** 0.229*** 0.225*** 0.224*** 
 
(0.0149) (0.0223) (0.0311) (0.0290) (0.0349) (0.0338) (0.0213) 
2008 0.0302 0.0353 -0.00629 0.0413 -7.50e-05 -0.00291 0.0265 
 
(0.0201) (0.0297) (0.0358) (0.0323) (0.0395) (0.0366) (0.0291) 
Unemployment rate * 
1993   
-0.00245 
 
-0.00310 -0.00313 
 
   
(0.00215) 
 
(0.00212) (0.00222) 
 
Unemployment rate * 
2008   
0.00672* 
 
0.00664* 0.00613* 
 
   
(0.00380) 
 
(0.00381) (0.00333) 
 
Debt * 1993 
   
0.000338 0.000442 0.000511 
 
    
(0.000453) (0.000454) (0.000449) 
 
Debt * 2008 
   
-0.000139 -0.000132 -0.000201 
 
    
(0.000288) (0.000286) (0.000309) 
 
Unemployment rate * 
debt      
-0.000157* -0.000151* 
      
(8.09e-05) (8.04e-05) 
Output gap -0.00900*** -0.00580** -0.00631** -0.00556** -0.00604** -0.00781*** -0.00759*** 
 
(0.00238) (0.00247) (0.00254) (0.00248) (0.00255) (0.00251) (0.00246) 
Working age 
population 
-0.00387** -0.00391* -0.00391* -0.00393* -0.00393* -0.00343 -0.00343 
 
(0.00184) (0.00213) (0.00211) (0.00214) (0.00213) (0.00211) (0.00211) 
Constant 0.243*** 0.245*** 0.244*** 0.244*** 0.244*** 0.205*** 0.207*** 
  (0.0371) (0.0381) (0.0380) (0.0382) (0.0381) (0.0430) (0.0428) 
R-squared 0.587 0.617 0.619 0.617 0.619 0.621 0.619 
Observations        512 487 487 487 487 487 487 
Note: Panel Corrected Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table A3. PCSE estimation for passive labour market expenditure 
 
Dependent variable: passive labour market spending 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Unemployment rate 0.0667*** 0.0545*** 0.0554*** 0.0538*** 0.0548*** 0.0254** 0.0283** 
 
(0.0102) (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0116) (0.0119) 
Debt 
 
0.00555*** 0.00568*** 0.00567*** 0.00582*** -0.00108 -0.000899 
  
(0.00167) (0.00160) (0.00159) (0.00153) (0.00216) (0.00229) 
1993 0.468*** 0.428*** 0.356*** 0.481*** 0.407*** 0.424*** 0.431*** 
 
(0.0637) (0.0743) (0.108) (0.0740) (0.109) (0.0990) (0.0730) 
2008 -0.387*** -0.455*** -0.551*** -0.484*** -0.572*** -0.562*** -0.410*** 
 
(0.0754) (0.0834) (0.103) (0.0850) (0.0977) (0.100) (0.0840) 
Unemployment rate * 
1993   
0.00804 
 
0.0104 0.0107 
 
   
(0.0118) 
 
(0.0116) (0.0107) 
 
Unemployment rate * 
2008   
0.0156 
 
0.0149 0.0181 
 
   
(0.0114) 
 
(0.0119) (0.0118) 
 
Debt * 1993 
   
-0.00123 -0.00162** -0.00203*** 
 
    
(0.000778) (0.000701) (0.000569) 
 
Debt * 2008 
   
0.000721 0.000609 0.00103* 
 
    
(0.000451) (0.000508) (0.000609) 
 
Unemployment rate * 
debt      
0.000903*** 0.000827*** 
      
(0.000212) (0.000208) 
Output gap -0.0521*** -0.0484*** -0.0496*** -0.0494*** -0.0507*** -0.0407*** -0.0386*** 
 
(0.00713) (0.00745) (0.00774) (0.00752) (0.00781) (0.00738) (0.00711) 
Working age 
population 
0.0121 0.0146* 0.0150* 0.0147* 0.0151* 0.0124 0.0119 
 
(0.00828) (0.00886) (0.00844) (0.00892) (0.00840) (0.00805) (0.00858) 
Constant 0.343*** 0.406*** 0.398*** 0.408*** 0.398*** 0.629*** 0.614*** 
  (0.118) (0.126) (0.123) (0.127) (0.123) (0.126) (0.129) 
R-squared 0.724 0.738 0.753 0.739 0.756 0.767 0.745 
Observations        526 501 501 501 501 501 501 
Note: Panel Corrected Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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